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While socio-economic development slowly progresses and democratic pro-
cesses do seem to be taking root in some African countries, on balance many 
challenges still remain in 2019. Relations on the continent as well as with 
Europe and other world regions also give a mixed impression. We present a 
selective analysis of “10 things to watch” in Africa in 2019. 
 • Democratisation: This is a year of crucial elections in many countries, including 
in important ones like Nigeria (February) and South Africa (April). Democrati-
sation will gain momentum in some countries, but the democratic aspirations 
of Africans will be confronted with shrinking space for civil society and other 
such tactics by authoritarian leaders. Ethiopia and Togo may represent two dif-
fering trajectories in this regard.
 • Peace and security: Challenges for peace and security connect to elite power 
struggles, conflicts between identity groups, and jihadism. Outcomes of elec-
tions may increase risks in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Identity and elite 
conflicts mix in Cameroon and South Sudan; in the latter case, prospects for the 
most recent peace deal are uncertain. Nigeria and other hotspots of jihadism 
in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa will require multilateral action, which will 
depend on reforming the African Union and subregional organisations as well 
as boosting peacekeeping.
 • Socio-economic development: Some signs point to momentum in developing an 
African free trade zone; a stronger voice in the post-Cotonou process will also 
help. A simmering threat for African economies is new debt crises, especially 
for those that struck deals with China.
Policy Implications
Our selective 10 things to watch in 2019 suggest a cautiously optimistic but still 
mixed picture regarding Africa’s trajectories. Africans and external actors such 
as the European Union and Germany should ensure clean elections. Where re-
form-oriented actors are identifiable, they need firm support. In cases like Cam-
eroon, pre-emptive action seems necessary. Reform of the African Union and 
of other regional organisations are, alongside peacekeeping, causes worth sup-
porting. Free trade zones and more equal trade with Africa is an important ad-
ditional measure, supplemented by donor-based initiatives. Germany’s member-
ship in the United Nations Security Council will matter, but with limited effect. 
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Election Watch and Democratisation 2019: The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly?  
This year started with two electoral surprises in sub-Saharan Africa. First, former 
Madagascan president Marc Ravalomanana accepted his electoral defeat and con-
gratulated his long-standing rival Andry Rajoelina, who had himself ousted Rav-
alomanana from power in 2009. Ravalomanana refrained from repeating history 
and did not ignite an election crisis, as he had done in 2002 when he challenged the 
election result and proclaimed himself president. A few hours later, the electoral 
commission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) caused utter astonish-
ment when it declared the opposition politician Felix Tshisekedi winner of the two-
year overdue presidential elections. However, rumours spread that a secret power-
sharing deal between outgoing president Joseph Kabila and Thisekedi had been 
struck. As such, election results may have been manipulated by the incumbent to 
ensure the victory of the “suitable” opposition candidate. Runner up, and possible 
actual winner, Martin Fayulu contested the results, filing a suit with the constitu-
tional court; this failed, and Thisekedi was officially declared winner. The African 
Union (AU) intervened diplomatically in mid-January to avoid the crisis over the 
election result lapsing into violence. 
The events in Madagascar and the DRC are only the prelude to a busy election 
year ahead. In 16 countries south of the Sahara, presidential or legislative elec-
tions are due in 2019. More elections are scheduled in countries that are classified 
as democracies by Freedom House and other democracy indices (e.g. Varieties of 
Democracy and the bertelsmann Transformation Index) than in fully authoritarian 
regimes. In four out of nine African democracies, national elections are planned for 
this year: botswana, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa. While in Namibia little 
doubt exists that SWAPO will secure another victory, botswana’s and South Af-
rica’s own dominant political parties have come under more serious pressure. South 
Africa finds itself in a particularly delicate situation, as the ruling ANC has lost 
ground to both leftist populists demanding “white land” and to the liberal Demo-
cratic Alliance. The ANC might increase its populist rhetoric, with possibly harmful 
socio-economic consequences. In Senegal, the level of electoral competition was 
contained when the Constitutional Council rejected the candidacies of the two po-
tentially strongest opposition candidates, Khalifa Sall and Karim Wade. 
Three authoritarian regimes promise either legislative elections, as in Cam-
eroon and Chad, or presidential ones, as in Mauritania. It is, however, uncertain 
whether the elections in Chad will indeed take place, having been repeatedly post-
poned since 2015. The bulk of this year’s elections will happen in countries in the 
grey zone between democracy and authoritarianism, such as Malawi, Mozambique, 
and Nigeria – the latter a crucial case. Four years after the widely celebrated first 
turnover at the ballot box in the country’s history, the elections’ outcome remains 
open with many risks attached – especially in light of multiple conflicts in Nigeria.
Popular support for elections has recently declined according to Afrobaro meter, 
a pan-African research network that has conducted public attitude surveys in more 
than 35 countries over seven rounds since 1999. Some 73 per cent of respondents 
think that political leaders should be chosen in regular, open, and honest elections 
in 2018, down from 81 per cent in 2015. This is, in fact, the lowest figure since the 
start of the continent-wide survey, presumably because citizens have become disil-
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lusioned with electoral manipulation – a (still) common feature in many electoral 
autocracies. At the same time, one should not forget that more than two-thirds of 
the people surveyed still prefer democracy. The gap between people’s democratic 
aspirations and the more sober reality can be a driver for further democratic gains 
in 2019 and the years to come, if Africans pressure leaders into listening to their 
demands. yet this divide might also become problematic in the near future, if disil-
lusioned citizens turn away from governments that consistently fail to deliver. 
Civil Society under Continued Pressure 
A growing number of governments in sub-Saharan Africa crack down on civil so-
ciety organisations – mirroring the current global trend of such restrictions being 
imposed. In so doing, African governments curtail the ability of civil society groups 
to monitor government behaviour, provide independent information on govern-
ment wrongdoing, or deliver key services to those in need. yet, the trend towards 
closing civic space is not uniform across organisations and regions. Restrictions 
tend to target non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially those with in-
ternational connections, rather than local collectives such as women’s cooperatives 
or church-based groups. Moreover, while space for civil society organisations is not 
shrinking in many countries in Southern and West Africa, those in East Africa (e.g. 
in burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and uganda) find themselves coming under 
increasing pressure.
This trend is likely to continue in 2019, because – once imposed – restric-
tions remain sticky. When restrictive legislation is passed, it remains valid until 
a replacement is ratified or the old version nullified. While civil society organisa-
tions in Africa increasingly resort to creative ways to resist government-imposed 
restrictions, the survival of civil society in closing and closed spaces also requires 
international pressure and support. First, it is important for foreign government 
actors and international NGOs to recognise the subtle ways in which governments 
restrict the operations of civil society organisations. Second, more systematic re-
search is needed to improve our predictive ability vis-à-vis restrictions. Such pre-
dictions could inform alternative planning, as severe and systematic government 
restrictions hamper civil society organisations from achieving programme goals. 
Third, civil society would benefit from more stable and guaranteed funding lines to 
diminish competition between state and civil society groups for foreign resources. 
Advice on how to attract funding from alternative sources may also help strengthen 
civil society’s capacity to resist restrictions. Capacity-building regarding alternative 
funding sources may help civil society organisations to continue operating even in 
times of financial constraint.
Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed on the Path to Further Reform and Peace
Following the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed as Ethiopian prime minister in April 
2018, the country went through a stunning series of political and (to a lesser extent) 
economic reforms. Abiy apologised for past mistakes by the ruling EPRDF coalition, 
especially with regard to human rights violations, released thousands of political 
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prisoners, legalised opposition parties that had formerly been labelled as “terror-
ist organisations,” put an end to Internet censorship, and called exiled opposition 
leaders back home to work together for the future of Ethiopia. He took measures 
against land grabbing and also appointed 50 per cent women to the new cabinet, includ-
ing the minister of defence. He engaged in dialogue with opposition parties and prom-
ised free and fair elections for the year 2020. He went as far as pardoning all leaders of 
armed guerrilla groups, and invited them to return.
In another surprising move, he broke the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
by accepting an international border verdict dating back to 2002 and reached out to 
Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki, inviting him to Addis Ababa. There, he turned the 
usually stern-looking dictator into a blissfully happy man who pledged to accept the 
Ethiopian PM as “our leader” (Zere 2018). In September, both countries signed a 
peace agreement, and Abiy worked on improving the relations between Djibouti 
and Asmara and facilitating a rapprochement between Somalia and Eritrea.  
The year 2019 will show whether Abiy can continue with his reforms, and 
whether he can improve security across the country. The prime minister survived 
an assassination attempt in June 2018, and managed to appease a mutiny by hun-
dreds of soldiers who entered the grounds of his office in September. Security has 
been tightened in recent months, but there is still a risk that opponents of his re-
forms among the Tigrayan elites or militant Oromo groups might make further at-
tempts on his life. The major challenge that Abiy faces is the ongoing ethnic violence 
in different parts of the country, which has internally displaced up to three million 
 people. It also seems that the Oromo Liberation Front is not willing to participate 
in a peaceful democratic process, planning instead to continue its armed struggle. 
besides containing ethnic violence, liberalisation of the economy despite the estab-
lishment’s resistance to that will be Abiy’s other significant challenge in the year 
ahead. 
Togo: A Moment of Truth
For a number of years now citizens of Togo, Africa’s most enduring autocracy, have 
been protesting the corrupt reign of Faure Gnassingbé, whose father took power 
in 1967. For eCOWAS, the community of West African states that has increasingly 
come to be seen as a “club of democracies,” the Togo crisis could, in 2019, become a 
moment of truth. Since 2018, the AU and the international community have recog-
nised eCOWAS as being chiefly responsible for political mediation between the gov-
ernment and opposition in Togo (also see our part on the division of labour between 
the AU and regional communities below). Unlike in Gambia in 2017, however, when 
eCOWAS took sides with the people and used military force to oust the dictator and 
defeated election candidate yayha Jammeh, the regional organisation’s credibility 
has suffered during the ongoing Togo crisis. In 2005, eCOWAS remained compla-
cent when Togolese security forces killed hundreds of citizens protesting the presi-
dential elections, through which Faure Gnassingbé sought to legitimise the dynastic 
transfer of power from his deceased father. The political crisis escalated again in 
2017, when the ruling party tried to facilitate two additional presidential terms for 
Gnassingbé via a constitutional referendum. Since then, the protest movement has 
mobilised hundreds of thousands of citizens – that in a country of barely eight mil-
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lion inhabitants. Fourteen opposition parties formed the “C14” alliance, and sought 
to negotiate a solution with the government. under Gnassingbé’s own chairman-
ship in July 2018, eCOWAS developed a road map towards a political settlement 
of the crisis – which included a formal commitment to presidential term limits, a 
revision of the voter registry, and abstinence from political repression (eCOWAS 
2018). However, the eCOWAS road map mostly just bought the ruling party ad-
ditional time. Since then, the regime has reacted with renewed repression and vio-
lence against the mounting public protests. The parliamentary elections in Decem-
ber 2018 were non-transparent and boycotted by the opposition parties.  Ahead of 
the 2020 presidential elections, it will become apparent whether street protests can 
force regime change, the regime will once more be able to cling onto power through 
coercion and repression, or whether the crisis can still be resolved through political 
mediation. 
Hotspots of Conflict: Power Struggles, Identity Group  
Dynamics, and Jihadism
Risks to peace in 2019 mainly connect to elite power struggles, public protests, ten-
sions between identity groups, and to jihadism. As discussed above, the aftermath 
of the surprising result of the DRC elections may ultimately change things for the 
better or for the worse. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic for now, as pro-
tests have not escalated of late. Identity and elite conflicts mix in Cameroon and 
South Sudan (ICG 2019); in the latter case, prospects for the most recent peace 
deal – signed in September 2018 – are uncertain. Riek Machiar and Salva Kiir have 
signed several agreements before, but their personal rivalries rather than ethnic 
antagonisms have been at the root of that country’s civil war. In Cameroon, the 
uprisings in the anglophone parts of the country need to be watched closely. An 
additional and potentially catalytic threat stems from the question of succession 
to the incumbent president Paul biya. being in his mid-eighties, and without an 
apparent heir, regional and international actors should start to work on the crisis 
now rather than wait for its escalation. More urgently, Nigeria – where elections 
and communal conflicts add additional risks – and other hotspots of jihadism in 
the whole of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa will require continued action as well. 
Jihadism has become the single-most visible feature of armed conflicts in Africa for 
a number of years now. The recent attack in Nairobi is a reminder of the continued 
potential for spillover. Countries must engage in robust action against jihadists, 
but initiate programmes to win the hearts and minds of potential ones too. Radical 
ideolo gies become relatively attractive where governments fail to deliver on secur-
ity, legitimacy, and welfare. International influences from North Africa and the 
Middle East, especially the Gulf States, should be closely watched and negated, if 
necessary. Peace and security will not be brought to Africa primarily from outside, 
though. Support for Africa is useful and necessary, but only African solutions will 
be sustainable in the long run.
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Implementation Is Key for AU Reform to Be Successful
At a number of summits, African heads of government intensely debated in 2018 
how to reform the AU – an issue that will be top of the agenda this year as well. 
Led by the outgoing Au chairperson, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, the main 
thrust has been to strengthen the Au’s funding and effectiveness. With regard to 
substantive issue areas, two reform decisions stand out regarding the Au’s role in 
resolving armed conflicts and building peace on the continent. First, the heads of 
government decided to reduce the number of AU departments from eight to six, to 
streamline the Au Commission’s work. This most notably includes the merging of 
the Departments of Peace and Security and of Political Affairs. The proponents of 
this reform argue that a more holistic approach will reduce overlap between the 
departments, and will allow the AU to more comprehensively tackle the structural 
causes of conflict issues (ISS 2018a). Second, at the end of the year, the Au Com-
mission reported that the Au Peace Fund – the organisation’s key funding mecha-
nism for peace and security initiatives on the continent – is now filled to the tune 
of USD 60 million. This represents an important step towards increasing own Afri-
can funding for mediation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding on the continent. 
Furthermore, the extraordinary summit decided to step up the AU sanctions regime 
for the non-payment of membership contributions. For instance, AU membership 
will now be suspended for those countries that have defaulted by two years instead 
of the previous five (African union 2018; ISS 2018a). yet the Au Constitutive Act 
(Article 23) already provides the right to “deny member states the right to speak in 
meetings, to vote, to present candidates for any positions or post within the Union 
or to benefit from any activity or commitments.” The problem has always been that 
these provisions are hardly ever put into practice. 
Going by past experience, it is most likely that in 2019 AU reforms will move 
forward only slowly. Reform proposals to strengthen the Au Commission’s effec-
tiveness are on the table, while others – for instance on the Pan-African Parlia-
ment – are still pending. The key issue, however, will be to put the decisions on AU 
reform into practice. Most African governments’ obsession with strong sovereignty 
norms – as on other continents worldwide too – puts an inherent burden on giving 
the AU Commission more weight. In addition, the AU will lose its reform champion 
at the top of the organisation in February: Rwanda’s President Kagame will hand 
over the AU chairmanship to Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the Egyptian president. In 2019, 
AU member states will probably only agree on the lowest common denominator 
when it comes to strengthening regional integration – at least in terms of political 
concessions. Some regional economic communities like eCOWAS will move for-
ward faster in order to deepen integration, and will take more decisive actions in 
the realm of peace and security. 
In the context of the AU reform process, the relationship between that organi-
sation and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) will play an increasingly im-
portant role in 2019. Past experience has shown that a clear division of labour is 
crucial here, so that peace and security issues can be tackled more coherently. In 
the case of the conflict in burundi, which was sparked by President Pierre Nku-
runziza’s controversial third term bid in 2015, continental rather than regional 
engagement was pronounced at first. The Au took the unprecedented step of au-
thorising the deployment of 5,000 peacekeepers in December 2015. However, the 
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threatened intervention never occurred due to a strong burundian pushback and 
concerns by several African heads of states about setting an unwanted precedent 
for future inter ventions (Wilén and Williams 2018). Disillusioned by this failure, 
the Au ceded responsibility for dealing with burundi’s ensuing conflict to the east 
African Community (eAC) – in line with its principle of subsidiarity. yet this shift 
of primary responsibility has been far from smooth, among other reasons because 
the division of labour remains unclear to some extent and because the AU contin-
ues to comment on how the eAC deals with the situation in burundi – even though 
the subregion is now supposed to be in the driving seat. If this year should indeed 
see a first step being taken towards addressing these long-standing frictions, coor-
dination meetings between the AU and RECs – which are supposed to take place 
annually from 2019 onwards – not only have to materialise but should be comple-
mented by regular (informal) exchange at the working level too. More systematic 
cooperation between the AU and RECs is crucial to developing a common stance on 
conflicts such as that in burundi.  
Germany’s Seat in the UN Security Council and the Need to 
Reform UN Peacekeeping
Germany began its two-year membership of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) in January 2019. While it does not have veto power as a non-permanent 
member, Germany’s influence should not be underestimated – also for dealing with 
Africa-related issues. Germany is now the fourth-largest contributor to the UN 
budget and the second-largest provider of humanitarian aid and official develop-
ment assistance. Also, Germany maintains good relations with most UN members, 
winning its bid for UNSC membership with the strongest polling of all contenders 
(184 out of 193 possible votes, where all candidates ran unopposed in their respec-
tive regional categories).
Second, Germany has long been an advocate for reform of the UNSC – with 
Foreign Minister Heiko Maas stating in September 2018 that: “We should stop 
beating around the bush and finally start real negotiations on Security Council re-
form.” “Real” negotiations may also bring opportunities for African countries to 
boost their own representation too. The question then is whether the reform pro-
moted by Germany and its allies also advances African countries’ interests. The 
G4 – brazil, Germany, India, and Japan – advocate for six new permanent and four 
new non-permanent seats, which would give African states two permanent and four 
non-permanent seats in a Security Council consisting of 25 members. The Common 
African Position on Security Council Reform calls for a total of two permanent and 
five non-permanent seats for African states in a council of 26 members. Another 
contested issue concerns veto rights: the G4 proposal envisages no veto powers for 
new permanent members, while the African position is opposed to the veto in gen-
eral but still insists that all permanent members have a right to veto decisions as 
long as this power still exists.  
Third, Germany’s topical priorities for its stint in the uNSC are relevant for 
African countries. Strengthening peace, justice, innovation, and partnerships have 
been announced as key goals of Germany’s tenure. The German ambassador to the 
UN, Christoph Heusgen, outlined that Germany will actively put new issues on the 
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agenda during its presidency of the uNSC in April 2019 and mid-2020. A first focus 
will be on women, peace, and security, more specifically on strengthening women’s 
representation in mediation processes and conflict prevention – and on combating 
sexual violence in conflict contexts such as South Sudan or the DRC. Moreover, 
climate and security will be a strong focus of Germany’s work, with the Lake Chad 
basin being a key example of a region where climate change, migratory pressures, 
conflict, and humanitarian crises all closely interact.
As one of the largest Western troop contributors to UN peacekeeping opera-
tions, Germany is directly affected by the fact that their personnel losses are higher 
in war-torn countries in Africa than in any other world region. This trend will likely 
continue in 2019, and brings with it the need to address a number of strategic ques-
tions regarding the design of future UN peacekeeping operations on the continent – 
an important task for the UNSC.  The UN currently concentrates its peacekeeping 
resources on conflicts in Africa indeed. Nearly 80,000 uniformed peacekeepers are 
deployed in six African countries: Central African Republic, DRC, Mali, South Su-
dan, Sudan (Darfur and Abyei), and Western Sahara. 
yet, greater peacekeeping efforts in absolute terms are not the only explanation 
for higher casualty numbers in Africa. Deaths of peacekeepers relative to the num-
bers deployed in a country are also higher in Africa than in any other world region. 
What makes peacekeeping in Africa more dangerous is the specific nature of the op-
erating environment and mandate of the blue helmets. Apart from Western Sahara, 
all peacekeeping operations in Africa are deployed in ongoing wars and tasked with 
robust and pre-emptive operations. Mali is an exemplary case of robust peacekeep-
ing. uN peacekeepers there coordinate with French and West African troops to fight 
Islamist insurgent groups, and thus explicitly side with the government. As such, 
robust operations blur the distinction between peacekeeping and combat. 
In this year’s lead-up to the overhaul of the uN peace and security architecture 
by 2020, fatalities and failures vis-à-vis peacekeeping in Africa should prompt stra-
tegic thinking about the future of these multilateral operations more generally. Cur-
rently, policy debates feature two avenues for change. First, UN peacekeeping op-
erations morph into effective counter-insurgency operations. This transition would 
require more personnel and equipment (for example, attack helicopters), greater 
operational intelligence, and the increased preparedness of individual soldiers for 
combat – endeavours of unlikely success, given the recent UN budget cuts and US 
scepticism about multilateral solutions. Second, and alternatively, UN peacekeep-
ing operations leave combat to state armies and regional organisations. As UNSC 
member in 2019 and significant contributor to the uN peacekeeping operation in 
Mali, Germany should hence keep in mind the proven track record of non-coercive 
strength of these operations.
Grand Strides for Africa’s Economic Integration
An impressive 44 African countries signed the African Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA) at the Au summit in Kigali in March 2018; five more followed suit later. 
Knowing the difficulties of regional integration in Africa, the big questions for 2019 
are if, when, and how the AfCFTA will become a reality. With news of additional 
ratifications coming in by the hour and the current total standing at 18, the quorum 
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of 22 official ratifications is within reach; the AfCFTA becoming official is a very 
realistic possibility in 2019. The next AU summit, in Addis Ababa in early 2019, will 
reveal whether the momentum can be maintained under the presidency of Egypt, 
one of the few countries that has not yet ratified the AfCFTA. 
The goal is ambitious: the AfCFTA is ultimately supposed to remove tariffs on 
90 per cent of goods over approximately the next 10 years, tackle non-trade bar-
riers, and liberalise trade in services. With intra-African trade in goods currently 
being at lower levels than trade within any other region of the world, there is a 
lot of room for improvement. The Economic Commission for Africa optimistically 
estimates that the AfCFTA would increase the value of intra-African trade in goods 
by 25 to 50 per cent over the next 20 years (Economic Commission for Africa and 
African Trade Policy Centre 2018). These increases would apply to both agricultural 
products and manufactured goods. Intra-African exports contain a higher share of 
manufactured goods than exports to non-African trade partners, thus suggesting 
that the level of export sophistication could rise under the AfCFTA. It faces signifi-
cant hurdles to implementation however, the first being ambivalent support due to 
fears of revenue losses and industrial competition. The North African countries and 
large parts of Central Africa have signed but not ratified the AfCFTA. botswana, 
Zambia, and Tanzania, crucial parts of the trade corridor between South Africa and 
the east African countries, have still not signed the AfCFTA. Nigeria, Africa’s larg-
est economy, faces considerable domestic resistance and has also not signed. The 
success of the AfCFTA hinges on gaining broader support in 2019. If successful, the 
AfCFTA could be a catalyst for stronger cooperation within the AU too – thus poten-
tially enhancing continental integration in other areas such as peace and security.  
A Stronger African Voice Emerges in the Post-Cotonou Negotiations
The Cotonou Agreement, which has governed European Union (EU) relations re-
garding trade, development cooperation, and the “political dimension” with Afri-
can, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states since the year 2000, is set to finally expire 
in 2020. Official negotiations for a successor agreement commenced in September 
2018. One year ago we argued that 2018 would set the tone for the post-Cotonou ne-
gotiations, and that they would be off to a bumpy start if a stronger African position 
did not emerge. This it did, however. Not only, as noted, did 44 AU member states 
sign up for the AfCFTA, but the AU Executive Council also unanimously decided 
to adopt the African Common Position for Negotiations. This calls for an EU–AU 
agreement that is separate from the ACP context, thus offering a legal basis for in-
cluding also North African states – which are not part of the ACP grouping. At his 
State of the Union address in September 2018, European Commission President 
Jean Claude Juncker similarly outlined the vision of an “EU–Africa” partnership 
with the long-term goal of establishing a continent-to-continent free trade agree-
ment. 
How exactly this common position will be reflected in the negotiations – in-
cluding the choice of negotiating partners, and also to what extent that joint stance 
can indeed strengthen the African side – remains to be seen in 2019. The critical 
question is whether the ACP secretariat or the AU negotiate on behalf of Africa (Fox 
2018). The EU position is to negotiate three regional agreements with Africa, the 
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Caribbean, and Pacific countries in the ACP context. After initial disagreements 
on the African side (ISS 2018b), the AU now favours a “two-track” process – with 
post-Cotonou negotiations in the ACP forum under the leadership of Togo’s For-
eign Minister Dussey, and parallel continent-to-continent negotiations under the 
auspices of the AU. Topics concerning all ACP states, such as aid and its delivery, 
could then be left to the post-Cotonou negotiations, while other more partnership-
oriented and Africa-specific topics – such as trade and migration – could be part of 
continent-to-continent ones. If the AU manages to strengthen its negotiating posi-
tion, the year ahead may constitute a crossroads for Africa–EU relations.  
Further Watch Africa’s Looming Debt Crises
Quickly rising sovereign debt levels are becoming more problematic across the en-
tire continent. As of January 2019, 17 low- and lower middle-income countries in 
Africa are either facing a high risk of debt distress or are already in the midst of 
it according to recent International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World bank joint debt 
sustainability assessments. Given that only eight countries fell into this category in 
2013 and 2014, and that low debt levels at the time partly owed to the success of 
multilateral debt relief initiatives, this is an alarming development. 
Public debt has not only risen but also its composition changed, in three key 
ways: First, there has been a surge in bond finance over the past decade, with es-
pecially lower middle-income countries such as Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, or Kenya in-
creasingly turning to international markets. Second, there has been a rise in bilat-
eral borrowing from countries outside the Paris Club (a group of creditor countries 
that are mostly Organisation for economic Co-operation and Development, OeCD, 
members) – most prominently, China. This category of borrowing accounted for 
almost one-third of the public and publicly guaranteed debt of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa in 2016. Third, the share of concessional debt – meaning that in-
cluding special conditions for developing countries – has declined. 
Taken together, these developments leave African governments more exposed 
to market conditions than before when it comes to government financing. Having 
benefitted from low interest rates and enthusiasm for emerging markets when is-
suing their bonds, governments might have to pay higher premia once they start 
maturing and need to be refinanced, in the 2020s. Loans from China are still a 
welcome alternative to Western conditionality for many, but come with their own 
caveats and put African debtors at the mercy of one single creditor. African coun-
tries are becoming increasingly weary of these downsides. 
This will be a decisive year for debtors and creditors alike, with new modes of 
debt management yet to emerge. African countries that are about to take on more 
debt may hopefully negotiate conditions well, and protect their assets. Angola, 
which had borrowed heavily from China and got into arrears following the global oil 
price deterioration and ensuing economic crisis, already secured IMF technical and 
financial assistance in late 2018. ethiopia managed to negotiate debt restructuring 
with China in 2018, but was nevertheless recently moved into the “high-risk” cat-
egory. The year ahead will also be a test for the Paris Club, where OeCD members 
and multilateral institutions were previously able to negotiate debt haircuts among 
themselves. 
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